GLBT Americans awoke Nov. 5 to the news they had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.
While right-wing candidates and causes were largely voted down at ballot boxes the day before, state proposals to constitutionally ban same-sex marriage in California, Florida and Arizona nonetheless prevailed, as did a law prohibiting gays and lesbians from adopting or serving as foster parents in Arkansas.
Of those defeats, none stung worse than Proposition 8.
Approved by 52 percent of California voters, Proposition 8 overrode a May ruling by the state’s supreme court legalizing same-sex marriage. In addition to banning gay and lesbian couples in the state from future marriages, the ballot initiative left about18,000 existing same-sex California marriages in legal limbo.
What went wrong?
Proposition 8 seemed to have more going against it than for it. California voters are among the nation’s most liberal, and they turned out on Nov. 4 to support Democrat Barack Obama by a whopping margin of 61-37 percent.
Popular Republican Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger campaigned against Proposition 8.
And while same-sex marriage supporters are often outspent in ballot fights, the No on 8 campaign amassed a war chest of $38 million. That was not only the most money ever raised to defeat such a measure, but it was as much as—or more than—the amount raised by gay opponents on the Christian right.
The story from the polls
In the wreckage following this defeat, GLBT activists and supporters groped for an explanation. The first place they turned their attention was to exit polls, which indicated that several demographic factors played a role.
The first of those factors—and the one that initially received all the attention—was race and ethnicity. While white and Asian voters narrowly opposed Proposition 8, African-American voters supported it by 70 percent and Latinos by 53 percent.
The polls found the greatest demographic divide on the issue was generational. Six in 10 voters under 30 opposed Proposition 8, while an equal number of voters 65 and over favored it. Voters 30 to 64, who made up most of the electorate, backed the measure by a small majority.
Another big difference could be seen along religious lines. Two-thirds of the seven in 10 voters who described themselves as Christian favored the initiative. Strong support also came from married voters and voters with children, while unmarried voters opposed it.
The picture that emerged from the polls showed that the vast majority of voters who were inclined to support Proposition 8 did just that. So what effect did the tens of millions of dollars poured into this race have on convincing people to change their hearts and their minds?‘Missed opportunity’
With this question hanging in the air, the finger-pointing began. Most of the criticism has focused on the organizers of the No on 8 campaign, which included representatives from more than 70 member organizations.
Critics say their campaign wrongly focused on intangible concepts such as discrimination and justice without offering a positive alternative argument for the morality of same-sex marriage.
“It seemed like there was a missed opportunity here for education in general,” says Cathy Renna. After more than a decade with the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), Renna is now managing partner of Renna Communications, based in Washington, D.C.
Renna and other critics say what was fatally missing from the No on 8 campaign’s advertising was the presence of actual gay and lesbian families telling their stories. By holding back on the emotional punch and choosing instead to focus on cold principles, they say the campaign failed to move people on the opposing side.
“I think the whole marriage debate in general has not been framed in a way that takes our relationships and our families out of more than a superficial or abstract context,” Renna says.
“We’ve not dug deep enough and tried to touch people’s hearts. Marriage is, at the end of the day, something that protects the most vulnerable in our community. That is a story that would deeply touch people and would help people understand why we want to get married.”
“I’m all for being polite,” Renna added, “but ‘please treat us equally’ doesn’t always work. It’s a little naïve.”
Comments by U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) that appeared in Maureen Dowd’s New York Times column on Nov. 23 seemed to support Renna’s assertion. Feinstein, who formerly opposed same-sex marriage rights, said her mind was changed as she learned about the positive effects that marriage had on the lives of her constituents.
“The longer I’ve lived, the more I’ve seen the happiness of people, the stability that these commitments bring to a life,” Feinstein said. “Many adopted children who would have ended up in foster care now have good solid homes and are brought up learning the difference between right and wrong. It’s a very positive thing.”
Next page: Why we lost
Turning point
Many observers of the Proposition 8 battle feel that a major turning point in favor of the measure came when Yes on 8 aired TV commercials warning that same-sex marriage would lead to kindergarten children being forced to learn about homosexuality.
Although this is a scare tactic that has been employed frequently in other same-sex marriage ballot initiatives, it seemed to take No on 8 campaign by surprise. The campaign responded by condemning the ads as false, but critics characterize the tone of the response as tepid.
Worse, they say the commercials forced No on 8 into a defensive position that might have been avoided if the campaign had run a more forceful, pro-active effort from the beginning.
“The No on 8 campaign began by allowing the Yes on 8 proponents to define the debate and it was never able to recover,” wrote Terry Leftgoff on the Bilerico Project. Leftgoff was formerly the highest ranking openly gay officer of the California Democratic Party. “This violated the first rule of political campaigns, which is to never let your opponent define you first.”
In the same article, Leftgoff also took the No on 8 campaign to task for failing to develop specific messages targeting African Americans, Latinos and Republicans.
“An effective target strategy would have been to send Democratic voters mailers with a picture of Barack Obama and other prominent diverse leaders who oppose Prop 8 and, alternately, to send Republican voters mailers with pictures of Arnold Schwarzenegger and other prominent religious and conservative leaders who oppose Prop 8,” Leftgoff wrote. “This is textbook targeting.”
Paul Hogarth, writing for the California Progress Report, said No on 8 allowed the opposition to mislead black voters into thinking that Obama supported their measure.
“Gay marriage supporters were not happy that Barack Obama said he believes marriage is ‘between a man and a woman,’ but he rarely got credit for going further than any presidential candidate had gone before,” Hogarth wrote.
“He supports fully repealing the Defense of Marriage Act, and—more importantly—he came out against California’s Proposition 8. Knowing that Obama was going to win the state comfortably, No on 8 should have stressed Obama’s opposition from Day One.”
“Polls showing Prop 8 either ahead or behind hinged almost completely on whether African-Americans strongly supported it—or barely supported it,” Hogarth continued. “Aggressive overtures needed to be made to that community, and there was no better messenger in this election for this group of voters than Barack Obama. Instead, No on 8 waited until the other side made their own hit piece that implied an Obama endorsement of Prop 8. By then, we were being reactive.”
Voter complacency
While not directly addressing these criticisms, No on 8 spokespeople have countered that their campaign was hurt mostly by complacency from their supporters stemming from polls that showed the measure losing by wide margins.
“It was difficult raising money because of those polls,” said Geoff Kors, head of Equality California and one of the campaign’s leading organizers, in an article that appeared in The Advocate.
In the same article, Lorrie Jean, another major organizer and head of the L.A. Gay and Lesbian Center, also complained of apathy.
“If we could have found a way to energize our community faster, we could have competed with (Yes on 8),” she told The Advocate. “We experienced enormous complacency in our community until we finally put out the word that we were going down.”
Some California activists have acknowledged they might have given Proposition 8 short shrift in their zeal to elect Obama. Hogarth wrote that he should have spent more time campaigning against Proposition 8 after it became clear in early October that Obama was going to sweep his state.
Some bloggers also have noted that the wording of the ballot initiative was confusing and probably cost No on 8 some votes: If they voted “yes,” were voters supporting or opposing same-sex marriage?
Silver linings
Despite losing, GLBT advocates have managed to find a couple of silver-linings to the Proposition 8 debacle.
In 2000, California voters approved Proposition 22, which banned same-sex marriage, by a margin of 61 percent—far more than the 52 percent who voted for the constitutional amendment this year. And the defeat has ignited a new wave of activism that GLBT advocates see as a positive sign.
“This gave people a kick in the ass who were maybe a little complacent before this happened,” Renna said. “This was a reality check. I hope people stay engaged. The question will be how the larger organizations integrate this new wave of activists and energy.”
The California Supreme Court is now considering three lawsuits that challenge Proposition 8 on the grounds that it overstepped voters’ authority in removing a legal right for a vulnerable minority group. Right-wing groups have issued a warning that they will seek to recall any justices who vote to overturn the measure.
The final words on Proposition 8 have yet to be spoken.
While right-wing candidates and causes were largely voted down at ballot boxes the day before, state proposals to constitutionally ban same-sex marriage in California, Florida and Arizona nonetheless prevailed, as did a law prohibiting gays and lesbians from adopting or serving as foster parents in Arkansas.
Of those defeats, none stung worse than Proposition 8.
Approved by 52 percent of California voters, Proposition 8 overrode a May ruling by the state’s supreme court legalizing same-sex marriage. In addition to banning gay and lesbian couples in the state from future marriages, the ballot initiative left about18,000 existing same-sex California marriages in legal limbo.
What went wrong?
Proposition 8 seemed to have more going against it than for it. California voters are among the nation’s most liberal, and they turned out on Nov. 4 to support Democrat Barack Obama by a whopping margin of 61-37 percent.
Popular Republican Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger campaigned against Proposition 8.
And while same-sex marriage supporters are often outspent in ballot fights, the No on 8 campaign amassed a war chest of $38 million. That was not only the most money ever raised to defeat such a measure, but it was as much as—or more than—the amount raised by gay opponents on the Christian right.
The story from the polls
In the wreckage following this defeat, GLBT activists and supporters groped for an explanation. The first place they turned their attention was to exit polls, which indicated that several demographic factors played a role.
The first of those factors—and the one that initially received all the attention—was race and ethnicity. While white and Asian voters narrowly opposed Proposition 8, African-American voters supported it by 70 percent and Latinos by 53 percent.
The polls found the greatest demographic divide on the issue was generational. Six in 10 voters under 30 opposed Proposition 8, while an equal number of voters 65 and over favored it. Voters 30 to 64, who made up most of the electorate, backed the measure by a small majority.
Another big difference could be seen along religious lines. Two-thirds of the seven in 10 voters who described themselves as Christian favored the initiative. Strong support also came from married voters and voters with children, while unmarried voters opposed it.
The picture that emerged from the polls showed that the vast majority of voters who were inclined to support Proposition 8 did just that. So what effect did the tens of millions of dollars poured into this race have on convincing people to change their hearts and their minds?‘Missed opportunity’
With this question hanging in the air, the finger-pointing began. Most of the criticism has focused on the organizers of the No on 8 campaign, which included representatives from more than 70 member organizations.
Critics say their campaign wrongly focused on intangible concepts such as discrimination and justice without offering a positive alternative argument for the morality of same-sex marriage.
“It seemed like there was a missed opportunity here for education in general,” says Cathy Renna. After more than a decade with the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), Renna is now managing partner of Renna Communications, based in Washington, D.C.
Renna and other critics say what was fatally missing from the No on 8 campaign’s advertising was the presence of actual gay and lesbian families telling their stories. By holding back on the emotional punch and choosing instead to focus on cold principles, they say the campaign failed to move people on the opposing side.
“I think the whole marriage debate in general has not been framed in a way that takes our relationships and our families out of more than a superficial or abstract context,” Renna says.
“We’ve not dug deep enough and tried to touch people’s hearts. Marriage is, at the end of the day, something that protects the most vulnerable in our community. That is a story that would deeply touch people and would help people understand why we want to get married.”
“I’m all for being polite,” Renna added, “but ‘please treat us equally’ doesn’t always work. It’s a little naïve.”
Comments by U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) that appeared in Maureen Dowd’s New York Times column on Nov. 23 seemed to support Renna’s assertion. Feinstein, who formerly opposed same-sex marriage rights, said her mind was changed as she learned about the positive effects that marriage had on the lives of her constituents.
“The longer I’ve lived, the more I’ve seen the happiness of people, the stability that these commitments bring to a life,” Feinstein said. “Many adopted children who would have ended up in foster care now have good solid homes and are brought up learning the difference between right and wrong. It’s a very positive thing.”
Next page: Why we lost
Turning point
Many observers of the Proposition 8 battle feel that a major turning point in favor of the measure came when Yes on 8 aired TV commercials warning that same-sex marriage would lead to kindergarten children being forced to learn about homosexuality.
Although this is a scare tactic that has been employed frequently in other same-sex marriage ballot initiatives, it seemed to take No on 8 campaign by surprise. The campaign responded by condemning the ads as false, but critics characterize the tone of the response as tepid.
Worse, they say the commercials forced No on 8 into a defensive position that might have been avoided if the campaign had run a more forceful, pro-active effort from the beginning.
“The No on 8 campaign began by allowing the Yes on 8 proponents to define the debate and it was never able to recover,” wrote Terry Leftgoff on the Bilerico Project. Leftgoff was formerly the highest ranking openly gay officer of the California Democratic Party. “This violated the first rule of political campaigns, which is to never let your opponent define you first.”
In the same article, Leftgoff also took the No on 8 campaign to task for failing to develop specific messages targeting African Americans, Latinos and Republicans.
“An effective target strategy would have been to send Democratic voters mailers with a picture of Barack Obama and other prominent diverse leaders who oppose Prop 8 and, alternately, to send Republican voters mailers with pictures of Arnold Schwarzenegger and other prominent religious and conservative leaders who oppose Prop 8,” Leftgoff wrote. “This is textbook targeting.”
Paul Hogarth, writing for the California Progress Report, said No on 8 allowed the opposition to mislead black voters into thinking that Obama supported their measure.
“Gay marriage supporters were not happy that Barack Obama said he believes marriage is ‘between a man and a woman,’ but he rarely got credit for going further than any presidential candidate had gone before,” Hogarth wrote.
“He supports fully repealing the Defense of Marriage Act, and—more importantly—he came out against California’s Proposition 8. Knowing that Obama was going to win the state comfortably, No on 8 should have stressed Obama’s opposition from Day One.”
“Polls showing Prop 8 either ahead or behind hinged almost completely on whether African-Americans strongly supported it—or barely supported it,” Hogarth continued. “Aggressive overtures needed to be made to that community, and there was no better messenger in this election for this group of voters than Barack Obama. Instead, No on 8 waited until the other side made their own hit piece that implied an Obama endorsement of Prop 8. By then, we were being reactive.”
Voter complacency
While not directly addressing these criticisms, No on 8 spokespeople have countered that their campaign was hurt mostly by complacency from their supporters stemming from polls that showed the measure losing by wide margins.
“It was difficult raising money because of those polls,” said Geoff Kors, head of Equality California and one of the campaign’s leading organizers, in an article that appeared in The Advocate.
In the same article, Lorrie Jean, another major organizer and head of the L.A. Gay and Lesbian Center, also complained of apathy.
“If we could have found a way to energize our community faster, we could have competed with (Yes on 8),” she told The Advocate. “We experienced enormous complacency in our community until we finally put out the word that we were going down.”
Some California activists have acknowledged they might have given Proposition 8 short shrift in their zeal to elect Obama. Hogarth wrote that he should have spent more time campaigning against Proposition 8 after it became clear in early October that Obama was going to sweep his state.
Some bloggers also have noted that the wording of the ballot initiative was confusing and probably cost No on 8 some votes: If they voted “yes,” were voters supporting or opposing same-sex marriage?
Silver linings
Despite losing, GLBT advocates have managed to find a couple of silver-linings to the Proposition 8 debacle.
In 2000, California voters approved Proposition 22, which banned same-sex marriage, by a margin of 61 percent—far more than the 52 percent who voted for the constitutional amendment this year. And the defeat has ignited a new wave of activism that GLBT advocates see as a positive sign.
“This gave people a kick in the ass who were maybe a little complacent before this happened,” Renna said. “This was a reality check. I hope people stay engaged. The question will be how the larger organizations integrate this new wave of activists and energy.”
The California Supreme Court is now considering three lawsuits that challenge Proposition 8 on the grounds that it overstepped voters’ authority in removing a legal right for a vulnerable minority group. Right-wing groups have issued a warning that they will seek to recall any justices who vote to overturn the measure.
The final words on Proposition 8 have yet to be spoken.
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